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The Diversity of Objections to Inequality 
T. M. Scanlon 
I believe that equality is an important political goal. That is to say, 
virtually every society is marked by forms of inequality the elimination 
of which is a political objective of the first importance. But when I ask 
myself why I think it so important that these inequalities should be 
eliminated, I find that my reasons for favoring equality are in fact quite 
diverse, and that most of them can be traced back to fundamental val-
ues other than equality itself. The idea that equality is, in itself, a fun-
damental moral value turns out to play a surprisingly limited role in 
my reasons for thinking that many of the forms of inequality which 
we see around us should be eliminated. 
When I say that the idea of equality plays surprisingly little role in 
my thinking here, I have in mind an idea of substantive equality-that 
it is morally important that people's lives or fates should be equal in 
some substantive way: equal in income, for example, or in overall wel-
fare. This is in contrast to a merely formal notion of equal consider-
ation, as stated for example in the principle that the comparable 
claims of each person deserve equal respect and should be given 
equal weight. This is an important principle. Its general acceptance 
represents an important moral advance, and it provides a fruitful-
even essential-starting point for moral argument. But taken by itself 
it is too abstract to exercise much force in the direction of substan-
tive equality. As Thomas Nagel and Amartya Sen have both pointed 
out,1 even a rights theorist such as Robert Nozick, who would not nor-
mally be counted an egalitarian, could accept this principle, since he 
holds that everyone's rights deserve equal respect. My hypothesis is 
that the bare idea of equal consideration leads us to substantively egal-
itarian consequences only via other more specific values that I will enu-
merate, most of which are not essentially egalitarian. 
In saying this I do not mean to attack equality or to "unmask" it 
as a false ideal. My aims, rather, are clarification and defense: clarifi-
cation, because I believe that we can understand familiar arguments 
for equality better by seeing the diversity of the considerations on which 
they are based; defense, because I think that the case for pursuing par-
ticular forms of equality is strengthened when we see how many dif-
ferent considerations point in this direction. Opponents of equality 
seem most convincing when they can portray equality as a peculiarly 
1 
abstract goal-conformity to a certain pattern-to which special moral 
value is attached.2 
I will begin by distinguishing what seem to me to be the funda-
mental moral reasons lying behind our objections to various forms of 
inequality. l will then illustrate these ideas by showing how they fig-
ure in various ways in Rawls's views about distributive justice. Finally, 
I will return to examine one of these values-the one which seems 
the most purely egalitarian-in more detail. Let me turn, then, to an 
enumeration of our reasons for finding the pursuit of equality a com-
pelling political goal. 
I 
In some cases our reason for favoring the elimination of inequal-
ities is at base a humanitarian concern-a concern, for example, to 
alleviate suffering. If some people are living under terrible conditions, 
while others are very well off indeed, then a transfer of resources from 
the better to the worse off, if it can be accomplished without other 
bad effects, is desirable as a way of alleviating suffering without cre-
ating new hardships of comparable severity. 
The impulse at work here is not essentially egalitarian. No intrin-
sic importance is attached to narrowing or eliminating the gap between 
rich and poor; this gap is important only because it provides an op-
portunity-a way of reducing the suffering of some without causing 
others to suffer a similar fate, and the strength of this reason for mov-
ing toward greater equality is a function of the urgency of the claims 
of those who are worse off, not of the magnitude of the gap which 
separates them from their more fortunate neighbors.3 
In characterizing this first reason, I have spoken of "the alleviation 
of suffering" in order to present this reason in its strongest form, but 
its force may still be felt in cases where, although the term "suffering" 
would be inappropriate, those who are "worse off' are hill living 
under conditions which we regard as seriously deficient. This force 
fades away, however, as we imagine the situation of both rich and 
"poor" to be greatly improved, while the difference between them is 
held constant ( or even increased). We may still feel, even in this im-
proved state, that the difference between richer and poorer ought to 
be reduced or eliminated. Our reason for thinking this will not, how-
ever, be the humanitarian concern I am presently concerned with, but 
some different reason, perhaps a more truly egalitarian one. 
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One possible reason for objecting to these differences would be 
the belief that it is an evil for people to be treated as inferior, or made 
to feel inferior. Social practices conferring privileges of rank or re-
quiring expressions of deference are objectionable on this ground, 
for example. So also is the existence of prevailing attitudes of supe-
riority ( e.g. racial superiority) even when these are not expressed in 
or taken to justify economic advantage or special social privileges. Large 
differences in material well-being can be objectionable on the same 
ground: when the mode oflife enjoyed by some people sets the norm 
for a society, those who are much worse off will feel inferiority and 
shame at the way they must live. 
The egalitarian character of this objection is shown by the fact that 
it provides a reason specifically for the elimination of the differences 
in question rather than for the improvement of the lot of the worse 
off in some more general sense. This is obviously so where the dif-
ferences are purely ones of status. But even where the basis of inferi-
ority is a difference in material well-being, the aim of avoiding 
stigmatization can in principle provide a reason for eliminating the 
benefits of the better off ( or for wishing that they had never been cre-
ated) even if these cannot be transferred to the worse off. If simply 
eliminating these benefits seems wrong (perhaps even perverse), this 
judgment reflects a willingness to sacrifice the aim of equality (in the 
sense under consideration) for the sake of material benefit. This 
aim-the ideal of a society in which people all regard one another as 
equals- has played an important role in radical egalitarian thinking-
a more important role than the idea of distributive justice which 
dominates much discussion of equality in our O}Vll time. This ideal may 
seem utopian, and there are interesting difficulties about how it 
should be understood. I will return to these matters later in my 
lecture, after some other reasons for favoring equality have been 
considered. 
A third reason for the elimination of inequalities is that they give 
some people an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of 
others. The most obvious example is economic power. Those who have 
vastly greater resources than anyone else not only enjoy greater leisure 
and higher levels of consumption but also can often determine what 
gets produced, what kinds of employment are offered, what the en-
vironment of a town or state is like, and what kind of life one can live 
there. In addition, economic advantage can be translated into great 
political power-for example into the kind of po'Yer that the recent 
Campaign Financing Laws were intended to curb. 
3 
This example brings me to a fourth reason for pursuing equality, 
which overlaps with the one just mentioned but should be listed sep-
arately. Some forms of equality are essential preconditions for the fair-
ness of certain processes, and the aim of making or keeping those 
processes fair may therefore give us a reason to oppos~ inequalities 
of these kinds, at least when they are very large. So, for example, in 
the case just mentioned, instead of speaking of unacceptable degrees 
of political power (thus appealing to the value of political liberty) we 
might have spoken instead of preserving the fairness of the political 
process. These two forms of argument overlap in this particular case, 
but they are in fact distinct. When inequality of starting points un-
dermines the fairness of a process, domination of those who are 
placed at a disadvantage does not always result, since the process may 
confer no power but only honor or the opportunity for a more pleas-
ant and rewarding life. Unfairness, however, remains, and can take 
several forms: some people, can simply be excluded from competition, 
or background conditions such as inequalities in training and re-
sources can render the competition unfair. So the idea of equality of 
opportunity-as expressed in the familiar metaphors of a "fair race" 
or "a level playing field"-provides a familiar example of this fourth 
reason for objecting to inequality: inequalities are objectionable when 
they undermine the fairness of important institutions. 
As the common contrast between "equality of opportunity" and 
"equality of results" indicates, this idea is only weakly egalitarian, 
since it can be compatible with large inequalities provided that they 
result from a fair process and do not disrupt the fairness of on-going 
competition. But, as I will now argue, the idea of a fair procedure can 
also provide another kind of reason for insisting on equality of out-
comes. (This is my fifth reason for objecting to inequalities.) 
Suppose that the members of a group have equal claims to a cer-
tain form of benefit, such as the wealth produced by their combined 
efforts. If a distributive procedure is supposed to be responsive to these 
claims, then it will be unfair if (absent some special reason) it gives 
some of these people a higher level of benefit than others. This pro-
vides, in schematic form, an argument which leads us to a prima facie 
case for equality in a certain dimension of benefit. Its starting points 
include an idea of fairness together with substantive premises about 
the claims that the people in question have to this benefit and about 
the function of a particular procedure. To generate a particular egal-
itarian conclusion we need to fill in the relevant premises, and the 
force of this conclusion will depend on how plausible these premises 
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are. We might, for example, begin with the idea that, other things equal, 
all individuals have equal claims to welfare. This sounds like quite a 
strong claim, but it might be a fairly weak one: much depends on how 
many things there are that might not be equal. A natural first step in 
specifying this would be to make explicit the fact that one class of rel-
evant differences are differences in the choices people have made. This 
yields the principle that people ought to be equal in the levels of wel-
fare they enjoy apart from differences in welfare resulting from their 
own free choices. I have not included an "other things equal" clause 
in the statement of this principle, but I assume that it is still only one 
moral idea among others, which might have to be sacrificed or bal-
anced for the sake of other values. 
These values enter in when we begin to specify the other premise 
mentioned above, that is, to ask what range of actions might be 
thought of as part of a "procedure" which is supposed to be respon-
sive to these equal claims. It would not be very plausible, for exam-
ple, to claim that all of our actions have this function (or must be 
thought of as part of a "procedure" with this aim). It does not seem 
that in general we are under even a "prima fade" duty to promote the 
equal welfare of all. A more plausible claim would be that the state, 
or in Rawls's phrase "the basic institutions of society," should be un-
derstood in this way, that is, as an institution whose function it is to 
respond to the ( equal) claims to welfare of all of its subjects ( equal, 
that is, apart from differences arising from individual choice). This 
is what might be called the "parental" conception of the state. I choose 
that term because it seems to me that the claim of unfairness to which 
this conception gives rise is similar to the one raised by a child who 
protests the fact that a sibling has received some benefit by saying 'That's 
not fair!". The similarity rests in the fact that both claims are grounded 
in an idea that the agent to whom it is addressed is under an equal 
duty to promote the welfare of each of the parties in question. 
As this description no doubt suggests, I do not myself find this 
conception of the state altogether compelling. A more plausible con-
ception, and hence a more plausible case for equality, can be obtained 
if we view the citizens not merely as beneficiaries but rather as par-
ticipants. It might be said, for example, that the basic institutions 
of a society should be seen as a cooperative enterprise producing cer-
tain benefits, and that citizens, as free and equal participants in this 
process, have (at least prima facie) equal claim to the benefits they 
collectively produce. (It is worth emphasizing that this premise does 
· not lead to the conclusion that people should be equal in all respects, 
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but only in their shares of these socially produced benefits. It 
therefore provides a plausible basis for some form of "equality of 
resources.") 
This claim to equal outcomes is not indisputable. It might be 
maintained, for example, that insofar as social institutions are seen 
as cooperative undertakings for mutal benefit the claims of partici-
pants to its products are not equal but proportional to their contri-
butions. My task here is not, however, to offer a full defense of the 
argument I have sketched, but rather to identify it as one among sev-
eral sources of egalitarianism. 
To summarize, I have identified five reasons for pursuing greater 
equality. The elimination of inequalities may be required in order to 
( 1) Relieve suffering or severe deprivation 
(2) Prevent stigmatizing differences in status 
(3) Avoid unacceptable forms of power or domination 
( 4) Preserve the equality of starting places which is required by pro-
cedural fairness. 
In addition, 
(5) Procedural fairness sometimes supports a case for equality of 
outcomes. 
At least two of these reasons, ( 1) and ( 3), are based on powerful 
moral ideas that are not fundamentally egalitarian. The ideas behind 
(2), on the other hand, are clearly egalitarian, but while they are cer-
tainly important they do not seem to have as much moral force as the 
humanitarian ideals expressed in (1). Reason ( 4) is only weakly egal-
itarian, since the idea of procedural fairness which supports it is com-
patible with great inequalities of some kinds as long as these do not 
undermine the fairness of the continuing process. This leaves (5) and 
(2) as the clearest expressions of egalitarianism. Reasons of type (5) 
are at least as powerful as those to which (2) appeals, but these rea-
sons come in a variety of forms, which vary in strength. The idea 
which they have in common is not that all men and women are cre-
ated equal but rather that if all the members of a certain group'have 
prima facie equal claim to benefit in a certain way then a fair proce-
dure for distributing such benefits must (in the absence of special jus-
tification) result in equal benefits. I imagine that everyone would 
agree to the truth of this conditional statement, but its uncontrover-
sial character is purchased by packing a great deal into its antecen-
dent. The egalitarian thrust of (5) arises from the claim that this 
antecedent is true in an important range of cases-e.g. that partici-
pants in many cooperative ventures do have prima facie equal claims 
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to the benefits produced, and, specifically, that this is so in the case 
of the basic institutions of a society. 
Are there further reasons for favoring equality which I have omit-
ted? The main possibility is a straightforward moral ideal of substan-
tive equality, that is to say, the idea that a society in which people are 
equally well-off ( as determined by some appropriate measure) is for 
that reason a morally better society. This is certainly an intelligible and 
even an appealing idea. But how much of a role does it actually play 
in our moral thinking? Reasons (1) through (5) discussed above are 
not, I think, derived from this idea. They are much more specific and 
have independent moral force. Once the distinctness of these reasons 
is recognized, how much force does the substantive ideal just men-
tioned retain? My own sense is that it may have the status of one ap-
pealing social ideal among others, but that it lacks the particular 
moral urgency which the idea of equality seems to have in ordinary 
political argument, a force which derives, I believe, from the other 
reasons I have listed. 
II 
To illustrate these five reasons for pursuing equality, I want now 
to consider how they figure in Rawls's theory of justice and account 
for much of the egalitarian content of his view. It may seem at first 
that Rawls's Difference Principle, which calls for us to maximize the 
expectations of the worst off, draws on the first of the reasons I men-
tioned: a humanitarian concern with the fate of the worst off. The ar-
gument for the use of the maximin rule, for example, seems to appeal 
to a first-person version of this concern insofar as it relies on the idea 
that there are certain outcomes "that one could hardly accept" and 
that it is rational, under the circumstances of the Original Position, 
to be primarily concerned with avoiding these outcomes, in compar-
ison with which other gains are relatively insignificant.4 Like the hu-
manitarian case for equality mentioned above, this reason for the 
Difference Principle would diminish in force if the possible positions 
of the worst off were to become more and more bearable, holding con-
stant the distance between these positions and those of the better off. 
But the case for the Difference Principle is not primarily "hu-
manitarian." That is to say, it is not primarily based in sympathy for 
the worst off. Rawls's central idea lies, rather, in his emphasis on see-
ing the basic structure of society as a fair system of cooperation, and 
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on taking the question of justice to be that of how the benefits of such 
cooperation are to be shared. The case for the Difference Principle 
then rests on an appeal to reasons (4) and (5) above: the need for 
equality of starting points as a precondition of procedural fairness, 
and the appeal of equal outputs as a fair mode of distribution. Con-
sider the latter first. This argument for the Difference Principle can 
be put in two steps. The first step is the prima facie case for equal shares 
as a fair way to distribute the fruits of cooperation among those who 
have participated in producing them'. The second step is the idea that 
departures from equality which leave everyone better off cannot rea-
sonably be objected to, as long as (a) the positions to which greater 
rewards are attached are "open to all under conditions of fair equal-
ity of opportunity" and (b) these inequalities do not give rise to un-
acceptable stigmatization of some members of the society as inferior. 
Rider (a) incorporates the fourth idea mentioned above, that (at 
least a degree of) equality of starting places has to be preserved as a 
precondition for procedural fairness. At least it does so if, as is clearly 
Rawls's intent, "fair equality of opportunity" is understood to include 
more than the mere absence of legal restrictions and discriminatory 
practices.5 The fact that this idea-of the importance of preserving 
at least approximate equality of starting positions-occurs only in a 
rider, as a constraint on permissible inequalities and a way of ward-
ing off possible objections, should not be allowed to obscure the cen-
tral role it plays in the positive case for the Difference Principle. This 
centrality is shown in the fact that this idea is the basis of one of the 
main objections which Rawls levels against alternatives to his conception 
of distributive justice. 6 For example, his objection to the laissez faire 
conception of justice that he calls "the system of natural liberty" is that 
the operation of this sytem over time can lead to great differences in 
family wealth with the result that individuals born into different po-
sitions in the society will have vastly different opportunities for edu-
cation and for entry into economic life, as well as different dispositions 
to make use of the opportunities they do have. An important part of 
the case for Rawls's Two Principles is the fact that institutions which 
· satisfy them will not be subject to this objection, and that, more gen-
erally, these principles guarantee the kind of _background necessary 
for a system of pure procedural justice. 
Along side of this argument, and complementary to it, is the idea 
that the system of natural liberty should be rejected because it allows 
people's life prospects to be determined by factors, such as fortunate 
family circumstances, which are "arbitrary from a moral point of 
8 
view." This might be understood as a restatement of the objection that 
l have just summarized: the system is unacceptable because it allows 
life prospects to be determined by competition under "arbitrary" con-
ditions, rather than under conditions of "background fairness." But 
it can also be seen as an appeal to type (5) unfairness: a system of nat-
ural liberty is unfair because outcomes which are sensitive to the "ac-
cidents of birth" are not responsive to the equal claims of "free and 
equal cooperating members of society." 
Because the distributive shares assigned to members of one gen-
eration are a large part of what determines the starting places of the 
next, considerations of these two kinds ( equality of starting places and 
equality of distributive shares) tend to converge. Insofar as the focus 
is on fair sharing of what individuals have produced as free and equal 
members of a cooperative scheme, (5) seems to be particularly cen-
tral; when the focus is on fairness to individuals born into certain so-
cial positions, their productive lives still lying ahead, ( 4) comes into 
play. Rawls certainly appeals at various points to reasons of both types. 
They are complementary but may differ in dialectical strength. 
As I mentioned above, the force of the idea that fairness demands 
equal distributive shares depends on a prior claim that as partici-
pants in a cooperative scheme the individuals in question have equal 
claim to the fruits of their cooperation. This is an appealing moral 
idea, but a controversial one to take as the starting point for an argu-
ment in support of a particular conception of justice. By contrast, 
appeals to ( 4) rest, in the first instance, on the more broadly shared 
idea that the legitimacy of holdings is undermined when the process 
through which they are gained is unfair. The controversy in this case 
is over conditions of fairness: What kind of initial conditions must be 
provided in order for a process to be one whose outcomes cannot be 
complained of? There is certainly wide disagreement on this question,7 
but there may also be more scope for internal argument (about how 
best to extrapolate from shared examples, etc.) .s 
Let me return now to the idea of "stigmatization." I incorporated 
this idea as a rider on my restatement ofRawls's Difference Principle: 
economic inequalities are unjust if they give rise to unacceptable 
stigmatization of some as inferior. Rawls did not, of course, deal with 
this problem through a separate rider. Instead, his measure of what 
it is for the lot of the worst off to be improved includes, as one com-
ponent, "the social bases of self-respect." His formulation thus allows, 
at least formally, for the possibility that loss in this dimension ofwell-
bei'ng might be compensated for by other advantages. I do not believe 
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that this difference in formulation will make much difference in prac-
tice, but I leave that question open.9 What is important for present 
purposes is that Rawls took it to be an important feature of his con-
ception of justice that it provided a more secure protection for indi-
vidual self-respect than did alternative conceptions such as utilitarianism 
or the "system of natural liberty." He stresses that this protection is 
provided not only by the Difference Principle but also by his First Prin-
ciple, which requires that the equal status of all citizens should be se-
cured by their having equal civil and political rights and liberties. 
The equality demanded by this principle is, on its face, rather for-
mal: it demands that all citizens have the most extensive system of equal 
basic liberties. This is formal insofar as it deals only with what the laws 
and constitution specify. But Rawls also asserts, as an important ad-
vantage of his Difference Principle, that by assuring nearly equal eco-
nomic shares it guarantees what he calls the "fair value" of these 
rights and liberties. The idea, then, is that the Difference Principle 
will be sufficiently egalitarian to insure the fairness of the political proc-
ess (an instance of ( 4)) and thus to prevent some from exercising an 
unacceptable degree of power over others (3). 
To conclude this brief discussion of Rawls: his argument for his 
Two Principles of justice, in particular for the second of these prin-
ciples, appeals directly or indirectly to at least four of the grounds for 
equality mentioned above, namely numbers (2) through (5), and 
perhaps to (1) as well. But (4), or a combination of (4) and (5), ap-
pears to play the most central role. This emphasis on the claims of 
citizens qua participants in a fair procedure helps to explain the fact 
that the Difference Principle is concerned with individuals' shares of 
"primary social goods" (i.e., the fruits of their cooperation) rather than 
with their levels of overall welfare. 
III 
The second reason that I presented, in Section I, for objecting to 
inequality was based on the iclea that "it is an evil for people to be treated 
as inferior, or made to feel inferior." I want now to consider, at least 
in a preliminary way, some of the difficulties involved in determining 
more exactly how this objection is to be understood. My initial state-
ment of this objection was cautiously ambivalent. It consisted of two 
parts, the first of which suggests that what is objectionable is a certain 
form of treatment (being treated as inferior, or not being "treated as 
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an equal") and the second suggests that the evil is an experiential one 
(being made to feel inferior). More needs to be said both about how 
this "experiential" component is to be understood and about how it 
is supposed to be related to the underlying forms of treatment in order 
to give rise to the objection in question. 
The experiential evil involved here can be characterized in several 
different ways-indeed, there are several different kinds of experience 
that one might have in mind. Let me distinguish two broad cate-
gories. The first, more "individualistic," characterization emphasizes 
what might be called damage to individuals' sense of self-worth: such 
things as feelings ofinferiority and even shame resulting from the be-
lief that one's life, abilities or accomplishments lack worth or are 
greatly inferior to those of others.10 The second category emphasizes 
damage to the bonds between people: what might be called the loss 
of fraternity resulting from great differences in people's material cir-
cumstances, accomplishments and the social importance accorded to 
them. Unlike the first, this is a loss suffered by the better off and worse 
off alike, and perhaps it is the more fully egalitarian of the two. Much 
more could be said by way of characterization of these two classes of 
experiential evils, but I will not pursue these questions here. My con-
cern will instead be with the independence of these evils from other 
objections to inequality and with the particular difficulty of avoiding 
them. I will concentrate on evils of the first of the two kinds just dis-
tinguished, but I believe that the same points apply as well to evils of 
the second sort. 
It is of course quite possible that someone might suffer from these 
forms of undesirable consciousness (such as a sense ofinferiority and 
worthlessness) simply from psychological causes that have nothing to 
do with the actual facts of one's society. This would be a misfortune, 
but not the basis of an objection to social institutions. Such objections 
arise only when institutions causepeople to have these undesirable feel-
ings. Let me consider three ways that institutions might do this. 
First, they might do it by depriving some people (but not others) 
of basic rights: denying them the right to move freely in public, the 
right to participate in politics, or the right to compete for other val-
ued positions in the society. People treated in these ways would cer-
tainly not be treated "as equals." But the main objection in such a case 
would be to these forms of treatment themselves, not to their expe-
riential consequences. So I will set this case aside. 
Second, institutions which were not otherwise unjust might nonethe-
less treat some people in ways that could only be understood as in-
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tended to express the view that they were inferior. This might be 
done by, say, attaching special "dishonorific" titles to their names, or 
by requiring them to defer to members of other groups whenever they 
met in public. These signs of status are clearly objectionable, and our 
reasons for objecting to them depend on the fact that those subject 
to these forms of treatment could reasonably feel shamed and hu-
miliated by them. 
But the same objection would apply to institutional arrangements 
that, while they di<i not have the aim of expressinginferiority, nonethe-
less had the effect of giving rise to feelings of inferiority on the part 
of most reasonable citizens. This is my third case. The obvious examples 
are economic institutions which yield such great disparities of wealth 
and income that some people experience shame and humiliation be-
cause they must live in a way that is far below what most people in the · 
society regard as minimally acceptable. There are also non-economic 
examples, such as a society in which almost everyone places great value 
and importance on certain forms of accomplishment, forms that 
many, but not all, can attain, and in which it is regarded as a great 
misfortune not to be "successful" in these ways. These views imply that 
those whose accomplishments do not measure up are inferior in im-
portant ways. In this respect this case is like my second one; but it is 
not the point of these practices (as it was of those in the previous case) 
to mark some out as inferior. That is merely the side effect of the recog-
nition of what is seen as valuable accomplishment and good fortune. 
While these two cases may be different, I will not make much of this 
difference here, but will suppose that both the second and the third 
cases I have just distinguished give rise to the objection to inequality 
that I earlier called "stigmatizing differences in status." My focus in 
the remainder of this lecture will be on the question of whether and 
how these objections can be met or avoided. 
Consider first a familiar example of objectionable inequality, the 
phenomena of racial and sexual discrimination in our societies. 
Women andAfrican Americans have for many years been denied op-
portunities for forms of achievement which are most recognized and 
valued in society, including political leadership, positions of eco-
nomic power and high status, positions recognizing accomplishment 
in academic, intellectual and even many parts of artistic life. As in the 
first of the three cases I just considered,· this denial is itself a form of 
unfairness: the process through which these positions and the re-
wards connected with them were awarded was unfair because women 
and blacks were not given the chance to compete. But this unfairness 
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i.s not the only evil involved, and not the one I want to focus on. It is 
unfair, and wounding, to be denied important opportunities because 
of your race or gender. But one _thing that makes this particularly 
wounding is the fact that race and gender are commonly taken to be 
signs of the lack of substantive qualification: stigmatization is added 
to unfairness when there is the (perhaps unstated) supposition that 
because you are not a white male you are less able to contribute to 
society and its culture in those ways that are regarded as particularly 
valuable and important. 
Suppose now that all the underlying unfairness in ths case were 
removed, and that everyone had a chance to compete on "equal 
terms." Assuming that the number of desired positions remained the 
same, and the number of competitors for them did not decrease, some 
people (a racially and sexually diverse group, let us suppose) would 
still be denied these rewards, and while they would not be excluded 
"from the start" by being ruled out of the competition they will, in an 
important sense, be denied rewards on the same grounds that women 
and blacks were: they will be judged to lack the relevant abilities and 
attainments. I will suppose that this meritocratic discrimination is 
not unfair: (1) it is not based on unfounded assumptions about dif-
ferences in ability but on actual, demonstrated differences, and (2) 
it is not unnecessary but serves important social goals. Nonetheless, 
as Thomas Nagel has pointed out,11 the resulting differences in sta-
tus and treatment are still to be regretted as objectionable inequali-
ties. The evil involved is the one we · have been considering: though 
not unfair, this meritocracy can be expected to deprive some people 
of a secure sense of self-worth-of the sense of their own value and 
the belief that their lives and accomplishments are worthwhile. 
This evil, being deprived of important grounds for a sense of self-
worth, is, as I have said, one of the important evils underlying the forms 
of discrimination with which we are familiar. In the case we are imag-
ining these forms of discrimination have been removed, but the rel-
evant experiential evil may remain and may even be aggravated in two 
respects. First, the inferiority would not be a matter of superstition, 
but will be documented by fair social practices. Second, if this fair mer-
itocracy has been reached through a process of overcoming discrim-
ination this history is likely to have the effect of dramatizing the value 
of the rewards and accomplishments in question and belittling the value 
of a life lived without them. In order to rouse the oppressed to battle 
and kindle sympathy and guilt in others, one would naturally emphasize 
not only the unfairness of discrimination but also the importance of 
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the opportunities and forms of accomplishment and recognition in 
question, and the great value of a life with these things as compared 
to one without them. This has the effect of condemning the lives which 
victims of discrimination have had to lead, and hence also the lives 
which others will continue to lead once this discrimination is overcome. 
Overcoming it may represent a gain in fairness, but there may be no 
decrease, and perhaps even an increase, in objectionable conse-
quences of inequality of the particular kind I am presently discussing. 
I am not urging the fatalist thesis that people should "stay in their 
places" since inequality cannot be eliminated but only shifted around. 
I am all in favor of the elimination of discrimination and the reduc-
tion of inequality. My aim here is to understand the diversity of the 
evils which it involves. An egalitarianism which decries the evil I am 
characterizing may seem hopelessly utopian, because it may seem 
that the distinctions which give rise to it can never be avoided. Try-
ing to eliminate them may seem to involve unacceptable costs not only 
in economic efficiency and the quality of the products of a culture 
but also in individual fulfillment. One thing individuals naturally and 
reasonably want is to develop their talents and to exercise these real-
ized abilities. Given an uneven distribution of talents, one result of 
this is that some will inevitably be distinguished from others in ways 
that generate the problem I have been discussing. Rousseau12 can be 
read as suggesting that this is an inevitable and even tragic conflict. 
Even if one does not hold out much hope for eliminating this conflict, 
however, it is possible to conceive of some ways of at least reducing it. 
The degree to which the accomplishment and rewards of some peo-
ple undermine the grounds of other people's sense of self-worth de-
pends upon the degree to which particular forms of ability and 
accomplishment are regarded as having pre-eminent importance. 
Even a highly differentiated meritocratic system of offices and rewards 
might not undermine the self-respect of those who are not successful 
in it if the attainments which it recognizes and rewards are regarded 
as less important indices of self-worth than good moral character, con-
scientiousness as a citizen, a~d devotion to the well-being of one's fam-
ily and friends. A society which accorded these qualities their proper 
value might be able to enjoy the benefits ofrewarding accomplishment 
without suffering the consequences which I am here decrying.13 
A second strategy is diversification. If there are many different forms 
of accomplishment and distinction no one, or no few, of which dom-
inate as the socially important measures of success in life, then the threat 
to people's sense of self-worth will be mitigated. This solution has been 
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proposed, in different forms, by both Rawls and Michael Walzer. 
Walzer has suggested14 that if there are many forms ofinequality, each 
confined to its own "sphere," they will to some extent cancel each other 
out, and their effects will be acceptable-even appropriate and de-
sirable. Rawls, on the other hand, has spoken of the partition of so-
ciety into what he calls "noncomparing groups": 
... the plurality of associations in a well-ordered society, 
each with its own secure internal life, tends to reduce the vis-
ibility, or at least the painful visibility, of variations in men's 
prospects. For we tend to compare our circumstances with 
others in the same or in a similar group as ourselves, or in po-
sitions that we regard as relevant to our aspirations. The vari-
ous associations in society tend to divide it into so many 
noncomparing groups, the discrepancies between these divi-
sions not attracting the kind of attention which unsettles the 
lives of those less well placed.15 
Each of these proposals may seem unsatisfactory when under-
stood as a general response to inequality; but there is much to be said 
for them when they are seen, in a more limited way, as a response merely 
to the aspect of inequality which I am presently discussing. Walzer, 
for example, advocates "complex equality" as a general solution to the 
problem of inequality. He argues that inequalities in wealth, power, fame 
and other goods are acceptable as long as each good is distributed on the 
grounds appropriate to it, and no one good is allowed to "dominate" the 
others as, for example, when wealth is used to buy power, fame, medical 
care and so on. In addition, he couples this view with a denial that there 
are general standards of justice which every society must satisfy. Both of 
these doctrines-his doctrine of "spheres" and his relativistic thesis-have 
been widely criticized. But the idea of complex equality is more appeal-
ing if we view it merely as a way of mitigating the conflict between the 
protection of self-worth and the necessity of recognizing differences in 
ability and accomplishment. There is some plausibility to the claim that 
this problem is best approached not by trying to minimize differences but 
rather by fostering a healthy multiplicity of distinctions and by trying to 
insure that no one (orno few) of these "dominates" the others by becoming 
established as the form of distinction that really matters. 
Similarly, Rawls's idea of noncomparing groups has been criticized 
because it has been seen as a way of making unacceptable inequalities seem 
acceptable by hiding them. But Rawls is supposing that the inequalities 
in question already satisfy principles of justice: they are justified in the 
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way that the Difference Principle requires, and conditions of fair equal-
ity of opportunity are assumed to obtain. The point could be put by say-
ing that people are owed more than fairness in the distribution of concrete 
goods: they are also owed a concern for the maintenance of their sense 
of self-worth (in his terms, self-respect) and this is, as I argued above, im-
portantly a matter of the character of their experience. Whether they rea-
sonably feel a loss of self-worth is a function not only of the inequalities 
which they know exist but of the way in which those inequalities figure 
in their lives. As far as this concern goes, then, the device of non comparing 
groups may be a perfectly appropriate one. 
I suggested earlier that the particular egalitarian concern which I have 
been discussing in this section-the problem of stigmatizing differences 
in status-is a source of strong motives for opposing inequality and a source 
which is more purely egalitarian than most of the others I have enumer-
ated. About its motivational strength there seems to me to be no doubt. 
The instinct to preserve the grounds of one's self-esteem and to oppose 
what threatens it is a powerful force in the world today, supporting not 
only struggles for greater equality but also, I would argue, forms of na-
tionalism and nativism, religious fundamentalism and racial and reli-
gious bigotry. It is commonly said, for example, that many white males 
see doctrines of racial and gender equality as a threat to their sense of 
standing and self-worth. 
What has to be claimed is that these reactions, however real they may 
be, are not reasonable and therefore do not support objections of the kind 
I have been discussing. In other cases, reasonable feelings of loss ofself-
esteem may be deserved, hence again not objectionable.16 What should 
be claimed, then, is that a regime of equality would be one that pro-
tected its members adequately against reasonable and undeserved feel-
ings of loss of self-esteem. 
To conclude: relief of suffering, avoidance of stigmatizing differ-
ences in status, prevention of domination of some by others, and the 
preservation of conditions of procedural fairness are basic and im-
portant moral values. Within the framework of the principle of equal 
· consideration they provide _strong reasons for the elimination of var-
ious inequalities. Taken together these values account for at least a 
large part of the importance that equality has in our political think-
ing. They may account for all of this importance, or there may be an 
important role to be played by a further moral idea of substantive equal-
ity. But it remains unclear exactly what that idea would be. 
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1. See Nagel, "Equality" in Morial Qµestions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), and Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
p.13. 
2. See, for example, Robert Nozick's objections in Chapters 7 and 8 of Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), I was led to the basic ideas of this lec-
ture in the course of working on a review ofNozick's book. Some of these ideas were 
briefly stated in that review, "Nozick on Rights, Liberty and Property," Philosophy & Pub-
lic Affairs 6 (1976). 
3. A point made by Derek Parfit in his 1991 Lindley Lecture, "Equality or Prior-
ity?". Harry Frankfurt has gone further, suggesting that we replace concern for equal-
ity with concern for "sufficiency." He writes, ''What is important from the moral point 
of view is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If 
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than others." See Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," in The Imporlance of What We 
Care About (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 134-5. In the present lecture I will 
be investigating whether, contrary to what Frankfurt says in this last sentence, there 
are further reasorts for caring about equality beyond the one I have so far identified. 
4. A Theory of justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 154. 
5. That this is Rawls's intent is made clear in A Theory of justice, esp. pp. 83-89. It is 
natural to think of "equality of opportunity" solely in terms of the competition for eco-
nomic advantage and positions of special status. In order for the considerations men-
tioned under (4) above to be fulfilled, however, it is essential to preserve the fairness 
of competition in the political realm. Rawls clearly believes and considers it important 
that this condition (what he calls "the fair value of political liberty") will be met when 
his Two Principles are satisfied (see A Theory of justice, pp. 224-227), but he does not 
make this an explicit condition on the inequalities permitted by the Difference Prin-
ciple. 
6. See A Theory of Justice, pp. 72-73. 
7. I defend the claim that this is the best way to understand the disagreement be-
tween Rawls and Nozick in Lecture 2 of 'The Significance of Choice," The Tanner Lec-
tures in Human Values VII, S. McMurrin, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). 
8. The more controversial character of appeals to (5) may seem to reflect the fact, 
mentioned above, that (5) represents a stronger egalitarian idea, since ( 4) appears at 
first to be compatible with wide inequality of output. This apparent difference may turn 
out to be illusory, however, once it is noticed how the benefits assigned to members of 
one generation affect the starting places of the next. Rawls's version of ( 4) is not the 
familiar, weak idea of equal opportunity, and the degree of equality required to secure 
fairness of starting places seems likely to be very great indeed. But the degree to which 
this observation makes the egalitarian consequences of ( 4) more stringent is precisely 
the area of disagreement over the interpretation of "fair grounds of competition" 
which was mentioned above. 
9. Russ Shafer-Landau pointed out in the discussion following this lecture that Rawls's 
inclusion of the "social bases of self-respect" in the list of primary social goods (i.e. the 
measure of distributive shares) represents an integration of my (2) into (5). The re-
sult is a focus not on "stigmatization" in general but on equality in the distribution of 
those social indicators of status that it is the business of basic institutions to define and 
distribute. 
10. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 440. 
11. In "Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 2 ( 1973), reprinted as 'The Policy of Preference" in Mortal Qµestions. My thought 
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experiment also has obvious similarities to Michael Young's famous fable, The Rise of 
the Meritocracy, 1870-2033 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963). 
12. In his First and Second Discourses. But it seems likely that his concern was more 
with what might be called a loss of fraternity than with what I have here termed a blow 
to individual self-respect. 
13. It might be countered (as Richard De George pointed out in the discussion fol-
lowing this lecture) that since people are bound to be unequal in these "moral at-
tainments" a society which gave them pre-eminent place would be just another form 
of meritocracy, admirable in some respects, perhaps, but just as damaging (maybe even 
more damaging) to the self-respect of those whom it condemns. The reply, I suppose, 
is that these feelings of loss of self-respect, if deserved, would not be objectionable. 
14. In his book, Spheres of justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 
15. A Theory of justice, pp. 536-7. 
16. See footnote 13 above. 
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